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Research has consistently shown that women’s involvement in household
decision making positively aﬀects household outcomes such as nutrition
and education of children. Is financial literacy a determinant for women
to participate in intra-household decision making? Using data on savings
groups in Rwanda, we examine this relationship and show that women
with higher financial literacy are more involved in financial and expendi-
ture decisions. Instrumental Variable estimations confirm a causal link.
For this reason, we perform a decomposition analysis breaking down the
gender gap in financial literacy into diﬀerences based on observed socio-
demographic and psychological characteristics and diﬀerences in returns
on these characteristics. Our results show high explanatory power by edu-
cation, happiness, symptoms of depression, and openness, but also suggest
that a substantial fraction can be explained by diﬀerences in returns. We
argue that this results from a strong role of society and culture.
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1. Introduction
Strengthening women empowerment within the household is not only a desirable goal
in itself but also has other positive welfare eﬀects (Duflo, 2012). Stronger involvement
of women in household decision making can have important eﬀects on outcomes such
as child mortality (Moursund and Kravdal, 2003; Thomas, 1990), nutrition, health,
and education of children (DFID, 2010; Duflo, 2003; Thomas, 1993). As one of the
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), the United Nations (UN) has therefore an-
nounced women’s empowerment and higher involvement in household decisions as an
integral part of the 2030 agenda (UN, 2015).
Liberating and enhancing women’s capacity to make choices within the household
is crucial to women empowerment (Alsop et al., 2005). Kabeer (1999) conceptualizes
women’s empowerment and divides the ability to make choices into three moments in
time. She frames the first moment as pre-condition or resource, the second moment
as action or agency, and the third one as achievement; whereby agency tends to be
operationalized as decision making. Based on early household models (McElroy and
Horney, 1981), resources often comprise material resources, such as income (Anderson
and Eswaran, 2009; Bobonis, 2009; De Brauw et al., 2014) and land ownership (Allen-
dorf, 2007). More recently, resources have also been defined more broadly as human
capital (see Doss, 2013; Fiala and He, 2017, for reviews).
This article contributes to the literature on the determinants of women’s agency
at home by examining the eﬀect of a specific type of human capital, that is finan-
cial literacy, on a specific type of agency, that is financial decision making within the
household. Throughout this manuscript financial literacy will refer to understanding
of financial concepts, such as interest rate, risk diversification, and inflation. Following
the framework developed by Kabeer (1999), financial literacy should act as a resource
of empowerment by increasing women’s ability and self-confidence to make financial
decisions and ultimately enhance their involvement in intra-household decision making.
Using household data collected from savings group members in the Southern Province
of rural Rwanda, we first run Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regressions to look at cor-
relations between financial literacy and women’s involvement in households financial
and expenditure decisions. We find that there is a strong and positive relationship.
The cross-sectional design of this study, however, prevents us from making causal
statements based on linear regressions. Although theory predicts a positive eﬀect of
financial literacy on women’s involvement in household financial decisions (Kabeer,
1999), causality may occur in both directions. To establish causality of this eﬀect, we
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chose an Instrumental Variable (IV) regression approach. This is a common approach
in the literature on the determinants of women’s agency at home. For instance, Doss
(2001) and Duflo and Udry (2004) use rainfall shocks to instrument for women’s agri-
cultural income and find expenditure shifts towards education and food.
Our identification strategy is based on financial literacy levels of other savings group
members as an instrument for woman’s own financial literacy level. Higher financial
literacy levels of peers provide women with more information on finances, but is argued
to not directly aﬀect their decision-making power at home. OLS and IV estimates are
comparable both in size and significance. This result and a large number of robust-
ness tests to validate our instrument allows us to conclude that the eﬀect is causal and
runs from financial literacy to increased involvement by women in household decision
making.
These results motivate further analysis on how to improve women’s financial literacy
levels. We first show that, in line with the literature (Bucher-Koenen et al., 2017; Xu
and Zia, 2012), women have lower financial literacy than men. So far, however, little
discussion exists about the reasons behind this gender gap. That is why in a second
step, we look at drivers behind this gender gap in financial literacy performing a de-
tailed decomposition analysis. Unlike previous studies, we have information on deeply
rooted personality traits in addition to more standard socio-demographic measures.
The results show that 47 per cent of the gap stems from gender diﬀerences in endow-
ments, particularly women’s lower educational attainment (18 per cent), lower open-
ness for new ideas (13 per cent), lower happiness (5 per cent), and greater symptoms
of depression (3 per cent). 53 per cent of the gender gap stems from gender diﬀerences
in returns on characteristics and thus remain unexplained by observed characteristics.
We interpret this as a strong role of society and culture as has previously been shown
by Filipiak and Walle (2015) for matrilineal societies in India and Grohmann et al.
(2016) in Thailand.
This article adds to a nascent literature on the eﬀect of financial literacy on fi-
nancial decision making, as reviewed by (Lusardi and Mitchell, 2014). The research
to date has tended to focus on financial outcomes rather than on decision-making
processes. For example, IV analyses show that financial literacy improves retirement
planning (Lusardi and Mitchell, 2007), wealth accumulation (van Rooij et al., 2012),
stock market participation (van Rooij et al., 2011), and reduces the amount of debt
held (Lusardi and Tufano, 2015; Gathergood, 2012). In developing countries, the lit-
erature is less extensive and the majority experimentally evaluate financial literacy
programmes (see Kaiser and Menkhoﬀ, 2017, for a meta-analysis). In Indonesia and
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India, Cole et al. (2011) find only modest eﬀects on account ownership for the poorest
segment of the treated populations. Doi et al. (2014) and Sayinzoga et al. (2015)
find significant impacts of financial literacy training on savings in the Philippines and
Rwanda, respectively.
A second set of studies have looked at the link between access to finances and
household decision making. Using an RCT, Ashraf et al. (2010) find that households
are more likely to buy female-oriented durables when they get access to a commit-
ment savings product. This implies women’s increased control over monetary decisions
at home. Likewise, Hashemi et al. (1996) provide evidence that bank or committee
memberships increase participation in household and purchasing decisions. Despite in-
creasing evidence on the material resources on intra-household decision making, there
are currently few studies which attempt to provide rigorous estimates of the impact
of skills and human capital.
Our research builds on these existing studies in several important ways. First, this
study is the first we are aware of to empirically examine the link between financial
literacy and intra-household decision making. Our IV approach provides a source of
identification. Secondly, we disentangle the determinants of the gender gap in financial
literacy taking into account a number of relevant personality traits.
These results can aid in designing policies intended to increase financial literacy
levels for women. In particular, the eﬀect of education and personality, together with
the large unexplained part of the decomposition analysis suggests that women may
benefit from tailored training that not only teaches financial concepts but also focuses
on forming life skills, such as self-confidence and gender awareness.
Following this introduction, the remainder of the manuscript is organized as fol-
lows: Section 2 describes the setting and section 3 presents the data. Section 4 looks
at women’s involvement in household decisions. In Section 5, we perform a decompo-
sition analysis. Section 6 provides robustness and Section 7 concludes.
2. Setting
2.1. Country context and savings groups
The Rwandan government and development organizations have made great eﬀorts to
promote women’s empowerment leading to a more balanced picture between men and
women in comparison with other sub-Saharan African countries. And even though in
Rwanda, women are well represented in the Parliament and other leadership organs,
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the country is still a patriarchal society and women lag behind in household decision
making. Cultural norms persist and men are still the decision makers (Abbott et al.,
2018). The majority of our female sample is informally employed in the agricultural
sector with low probability to be economically included. In this context, women still
lag behind in decision-making both socially and economically and the question how
to increase their household decision-making power is highly relevant.
Our analysis relies on primary household data of savings groups in the Southern
Province of Rwanda, a rural area where the majority of people save in informal groups
such as tontines or Village Savings and Loan Associations (VSLAs).1 The most recent
FinScope report for Rwanda shows that on average about 54 per cent of adults use
informal savings groups to manage their savings (FinScope, 2016). In the rural South,
this number is likely higher and savings groups provide an important tool of ensuring
financial inclusion for the most vulnerable. A typical VSLA in Rwanda is gender-
mixed and consists of 15 to 30 people, with more than 75 per cent being women.
Members meet once a week to contribute to or borrow from a shared fund. Savings
are often as little as one or two hundred Rwandan Francs (RWF) (less than 0.25 USD)
per week. Eight to twelve months after the savings circle has started, each member
will receive her share-out of the fund and her accumulated savings.
It is possible that this regular meeting and contribution structure may increase
understanding of financial concepts and that this, together with selection issues, means
that our sample has higher interest in money management that likely goes beyond
the financial literacy of other rural residents. The decomposition analysis benefits
from this, as unobservable factors related to financial interest can to some extent
be neglected. Given that members voluntarily select themselves into groups, it is
possible that the composition of groups is related to wealth, education or other socio-
demographic characteristics. A comparison of our sample to the Rwandan Housing
and Population Census 2012 (NISR, 2012) shows that the sample is comparatively
less educated and poorer than the overall Rwandan population. This is, however, not
systematic between men and women.
Unlike previous household surveys in developing countries, the sample not only
includes the household head and hence the potential financial decision maker, but
instead is representative for all savings group members in southern Rwanda. This can
include the household head or any other household member. It is therefore well suited
to study the eﬀect of financial literacy on women’s involvement in household decisions.
1See Karlan et al. (2017) for a detailed description of the VSLA model.
4
2.2. Sampling
Sampling was done in two random stages. First, we stratified the sample by district
and drew a total of 300 VSLAs from a complete list of all active VSLAs in southern
Rwanda. Second, we randomly selected five individuals from each VSLA. This was
done by first compiling a list of all active members of the visited VSLA. Using smart
mobile devices, a random number generator then randomly selected five names from
this list. Our sample is, hence, representative for VSLA members in Rwanda’s South-
ern Province. The target population is older than 18 years. Respondents also qualify
as poor according to Rwanda’s poverty levels2 and have limited access to formal finan-
cial services provider. We designed the questionnaire specifically to answer questions
regarding financial issues of the household. It contains questions on the household’s
socio-demographic variables, household composition, intra-household decision making,
financial services used and financial literacy. Each interview took about 45 minutes.
The final sample collected in 2015 covers 283 of the 300 sampled VSLAs and about
1400 respondents. 17 VSLAs from the initial list of active groups either no longer
existed or could not be reached. No VSLA refused to participate in the survey.
3. Descriptive statistics and variables
3.1. Socio-demographics
Summary statistics are presented in Table 1 separated by gender. Respondents are on
average 40 years old, married and poorly educated. Only 57 per cent of women and
72 per cent of men can spell a simple word in the local language correctly. Women are
also more likely to be widowed than men. Looking at measures for personality such
as happiness and the depression index3, women’s indices are below that of men. The
majority of respondents report farming as their main occupation, which they undertake
independently and in employment for others. The average household size is about five.
What is interesting in this data is that the highest proportion of female savings groups
members tend to belong to the lowest income quartile, whereas the highest proportion
2In Rwanda, poor people are selected into the first or second ‘Ubudehe category’.
3We use the widely known ‘Center for Epidemiologic Studies Depression Scale Revised’ (CESD-R).
It is standard battery of 20 questions that measure depression and depressive disorders in nine
diﬀerent groups: sadness, loss of interest, appetite, sleep, thinking and concentration, guilt, tired,
movement, suicidal ideation (Radloﬀ, 1977; Eaton et al., 2004).
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of their male counterparts belong to the upper income quartile.4 We also construct an
asset index that is the first principal component of the respondents reported assets.
This asset index indicates that women participate in VSLAs out of poorer households
than men. Moreover, mobile phone ownership is less likely in households of female
than male savings groups members.
- set Table 1 about here -
3.2. Intra-household decision making
The first part of this article focuses on financial decision making as outcomes of inter-
est. Outcome variables are defined as who within the household decides on income,
credit, investment, and expenditure decisions. The latter is further divided into energy
and food expenses of the household, women’s own health and clothing expenses, and
children’s health and clothing expenses. These indicators are similar to those included
in Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) and have previously been used by Allen-
dorf (2007) and Connelly et al. (2010) to study intra-household decision making.
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics. The majority of both sexes indicate to jointly
decide on financial matters. In comparison with men, women are more likely to re-
port that they either make the decision themselves or that their husbands make the
decision alone. On the contrary, men are more likely than women to report that both
partners make the decision together. Patterns are consistent for all types of financial
decisions.
- set Table 2 about here -
3.3. Financial literacy gender gap
We measure financial literacy using an adjusted version of the Lusardi and Mitchell
(2011) questions and developed further by Cole et al. (2011). This approach focuses
on numeracy skills for calculating financial trade-oﬀs. Questions that were asked are
the following:
• Suppose you borrow RWF 10,000 from a moneylender at an interest rate of two
per cent per month, with no repayment for three months. After three months,
do you owe less than RWF 10,200, exactly RWF 10,200, or more than RWF
10,200?
4We use expenditures to proxy for income. All expenditure categories were aggregated on a yearly
base and further divided into fourths.
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• If you have RWF 10,000 in a savings account earning one per cent interest per
annum, and prices for goods and services rise two per cent over a one-year period,
can you buy more than, less than, or the same amount of goods in one year as
you could today, with the money in the account?
• Is it riskier to plant multiple crops or one crop?
• Suppose you need to borrow RWF 50,000. Two people oﬀer you a loan. One loan
requires you to pay back RWF 60,000 in one month. The second loan requires
you to pay back in one month RWF 50,000 plus 15 per cent interest. Which loan
represents a better deal for you?
All questions were multiple choice; two questions with two possible answers and two
questions with three possible answers. Respondents also had the option to answer
‘I don’t know’ or to refuse to answer. For each question the respondent provides a
correct answer for, she receives one point. That means that the aggregated financial
literacy index ranges from zero to four.
In comparison to studies in countries with a similar level of development, respon-
dents in our Rwandan sample are slightly more financially literate, for example more
literate than the Indian sample used in Cole et al. (2011). The proportion of correct
answers is highest for the question on risk-diversification. Since 92 per cent of respon-
dents are working in the agricultural sector, this might be obvious as the question is
framed in a manner requiring agricultural knowledge. In contrast, knowledge in basic
numeracy is low.
Figure 1 shows the share of correct answers broken down by gender.5 On average,
women are less likely than men to provide correct answers. Only 45 per cent of female
respondents and 61 per cent of male respondents correctly answered the borrowing
decision. 57 per cent of men showed basic understanding of interest and inflation. In
contrast, only 45 per cent of women correctly dealt with these economic concepts (see
Table 3). While 34 per cent of men correctly answered all four questions, only 22 per
cent of women did so. The financial literacy level is significantly lower for women than
for men, irrespective of how financial literacy is measured (see Table 4).
- set Figure 1 about here -
Furthermore, women are more likely to indicate that they do not know the correct
answer. As many as 26 per cent of women indicated that they do not know the answer
5Table A.1 in the Appendix compares financial literacy over additional socio-demographic categories.
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to the first compound interest question, whereas the proportion of men is much lower
(15 per cent) (see Table 3). 35 per cent of women gave at least one ‘don’t know’
response to one of four financial literacy questions, the proportion of men doing so is
about 19 per cent (see Table 4).
- set Table 3 about here -
- set Table 4 about here -
Our findings confirm results found in other studies on financial literacy and gender,
where women are more likely to say that they do not know the answer and perform
worse than men (Bucher-Koenen et al., 2017). This is true even for the most educated
women (Mahdavi and Horton, 2014). So far, only very little evidence exists on the
reasons behind this gender gap. Grohmann et al. (2016) argue that the gender gap
is caused by culture and that financial literacy is similar between sexes in Thailand
because Thai women are traditionally in charge of financial matters. Likewise, Filipiak
and Walle (2015) find that women in matrilineal societies in India have better financial
literacy than women living in patrilineal societies. Hsu (2016) attributes women’s lower
financial literacy to specialization of tasks within the household.
4. Financial literacy and decision making
4.1. OLS analysis
To examine the link between financial literacy and intra-household financial decision
making, we first look at simple OLS regressions. We regress the financial literacy index
described above against three financial decisions and two indexes. We look at three
types of financial decisions that are income, credit, and investment decisions. Results
are shown in Table 5. In columns one to three, we display outcome variables that are
unity if a woman is involved in a financial decision. This means that she reports that
she either makes the decision alone or that she and her husband make the decision
together. We decided to focus on this outcome variable, as it is woman’s involvement in
financial decision making that is argued to have positive eﬀects on household welfare,
rather than women taking decisions alone (Duflo, 2012). Nevertheless, we also look
at sole decision making in the Appendix.6 In columns four and five, we report two
6In Table A.2, we regress financial literacy against whether a woman reports that she makes financial
decisions alone. The results show a negative relationship, probably because women who make
household decision themselves are more likely to be widowed and these tend to have lower financial
literacy.
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indexes, one for financial decisions and one for expenditure decisions. The financial
decisions index is the sum among income, credit, and investment decisions that a
woman is involved in. The expenditure decisions index is the total of the following
six decisions that a woman is involved in: food and energy, own health and clothing,
and children’s health and clothing decisions. Results for the individual decisions are
shown in the Appendix.7
In all regressions in Table 5, we include a set of control variables that have been
shown to be correlated with someone’s financial literacy level, such as age, whether the
person can read and write, and marital status with being single acting as the excluded
category (Lusardi and Mitchell, 2014). We further control for the number of household
members and the number of children in diﬀerent age groups. Four expenditure quartile
dummies proxy for income because it is commonly hard to measure in developing
countries. The lowest expenditure quartile is excluded from the regression. An asset
index using the first principal of a principal component analysis additionally controls
for household wealth.
- set Table 5 about here -
The results in Table 5 show that there is a clear and strong correlation between
financial literacy and women’s involvement in household decision making. This rela-
tionship is positive and economically significant for individual financial decisions as
well as for the two indexes. It is significant despite the large number of control vari-
ables entering the regressions.
Apart from financial literacy, other expected patterns can be observed. Older women
tend to be more involved in intra-household decision making, albeit this relationship
is non-linear. Women who are married, divorced or widowed are less likely to be in-
volved in household decisions than women who are single. There is also a negative
relationship between a woman having decision-making power within the household and
the size of that household in which she lives. Interestingly, women’s decision-making
power is not significantly associated with income and wealth.
The most striking result to emerge from the data is, however, the correlation be-
tween financial literacy and women’s involvement in household decision making. The
eﬀect of being able to correctly answer one more financial literacy question is, for
7Table A.3 shows results for OLS regression on expenditure decisions at home. There is a significant
positive correlation between a woman’s financial literacy and her involvement in household’s food
and energy consumption as well as her own health and clothing decisions. Her decisions regarding
children’s health and clothing are not significantly associated with financial literacy.
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example, larger than the eﬀect of being one year older. In the next section, we employ
IV regression to establish whether this finding is causal.
4.2. IV analysis
The cross-sectional design of this study poses potential endogeneity problems due
to omitted variable bias or reverse causality. For example, unobservable personal at-
tributes could drive financial literacy and decision making at the same time. Similarly,
it is possible that reverse causality is at play and that decision makers use their greater
agency to learn about financial matters. Of course, better financial literacy might then
further enhance involvement in household decisions. We, however, extrapolate theo-
retical backing for a positive causal relationship running from financial literacy to more
involvement in intra-household decision making by women. In line with the concept by
Kabeer (1999), financial literacy can be thought of as a resource that aﬀects decision
making.
To nullify endogeneity issues, we employ an IV approach. We collected a number
of potential instruments such as whether parents taught their children how to budget,
the proportion of people in a district who report the nearest bank to be less than 30
minutes away, the proportion of people who report the nearest market to be less than
30 minutes away, the quality of the public transport. Yet, none of these potential
instruments pass the standard tests for weak instruments. Instead, our identification
strategy is based on the VSLA’s average financial literacy index excluding the person
who is examined. This instrument is highly correlated with the financial literacy of
that person as group members are likely to learn from each other.
The IV regression results, as shown in Table 6, indicate similar patterns as simple
OLS regression analyses in Table 5.8 Financial literacy has a significantly positive ef-
fect on women’s involvement in intra-household financial decision making. This holds
for the three financial decisions as well as for the two indexes. Interestingly, the size of
the coeﬃcient is similar between OLS and IV models, which is unusual in the financial
literacy literature.
Our identification strategy assumes that after adding all demographic, household,
and wealth controls, the average financial literacy of other group members has no
independent impact on household decision making. Following conventional intra-
household, decision-making theory, we believe that each household member’s con-
tribution to the household determines decision-making power at home (McElroy and
8Results separated by expenditure decisions are listed in Table A.4 in the Appendix.
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Horney, 1981). Hence, we argue that intra-household decision making is a private
process determined by the members of that household. We examine possible threats
to this exclusion restriction in the robustness section below. Another concern may
arise if financial literacy levels vary with the location people live in. This is espe-
cially worrisome when some savings groups are on average more financially literate
than others because they live in more progressive areas where women are also more
involved in household decisions. Mapping the study groups, however, mitigates this
concern because the variation in VSLA average financial literacy is not systematic be-
tween rural and more urban areas (see Figure A.1). Table A.5 in the Appendix further
shows no significant correlations between group financial literacy levels and distances
to urban spots such as markets or health centres. Moreover, groups with high financial
literacy and groups with low financial literacy may diﬀer in other ways, which then
influences their financial decision making. In Table A.6, we run t-tests between groups
with financial literacy above the mean and groups with financial literacy below the
mean and see that there are no significant diﬀerences in observables. We also show
that the coeﬃcient on the IV is not sensitive to the inclusion of covariates (see Table
A.7). This indicates little eﬀect of unobserved variable bias. Another concern could
be other group specific characteristics, apart from the location, that influence both
financial literacy and decision-making processes within the household. Table A.8 in
the Appendix, therefore, shows IV results with group fixed eﬀects. These findings
establish similar relationships between financial literacy and intra-household decision
making, albeit only statistically significant for the financial decisions index.
As a consequence, we rule out unobserved variables or selection into groups that
are better financially educated as drivers of our results. We believe that the only
channel through which the instrument aﬀects intra-household decision making is via
the financial literacy of the individual. We, therefore, argue that there is a causal
relationship and that higher financial literacy strengthens women’s intra-household
decision making.
- set Table 6 about here -
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5. Analysing the financial literacy gender gap
5.1. Empirical strategy
Previous sections show: (a) that there is a significant diﬀerence in financial literacy
between men and women, and (b) that financial literacy is an important aspect for
women’s involvement in intra-household decision making. As a tangible consequence,
this section investigates why men outperform women on financial literacy and so aims
to inform policy makers on how to improve women’s financial literacy. This is done
in two steps. First, we run a simple multivariate regression with the financial liter-
acy index as dependent variable in order to explore the heterogeneity along potential
covariates. Second, we use the multivariate decomposition technique popularized by
Blinder (1973) and Oaxaca (1973) to study mean outcome diﬀerences in financial liter-
acy between men and women. The decomposition tests two explanatory approaches:
(i) one that explains diﬀerences based on observed characteristics (‘the endowment
eﬀect’), and (ii) another that explains diﬀerences in returns on these characteristics
(‘the coeﬃcient eﬀect’).
Diﬀerences in financial literacy may exist due to gender diﬀerences in endowments;
for example, when women are less educated than men. What would be the average
financial literacy of women if they would be just as educated as men? Would this
counterfactual financial literacy level of women be improved? Or would women still
face lower returns to education and thus score lower in financial literacy tests, most
likely due to societal or environmental factors. Previous evidence shows that marital
status, age, education, and income can only partially explain the diﬀerence in finan-
cial literacy between men and women (Fonseca et al., 2012; Bucher-Koenen et al.,
2017). That is why we examine whether diﬀerences in financial literacy hold when we
apply men’s coeﬃcients to women’s endowments.9 These findings are important to
inform policymakers who aim to increase women’s financial literacy by highlighting
the relative contribution of personal characteristics (the endowment eﬀect or explained
variables) and the cultural and societal context the person lives in (the coeﬃcient ef-
fect or unexplained variables).
A general formulation of the two-fold decomposition technique is provided by Yun
(2004). He proposes to decompose diﬀerences not only in sample means but rather in
first moments, and so to extend the linear Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition to non-linear
9Depending on the context of the research question, the coeﬃcient eﬀect has been interpreted in
diﬀerent ways. In the gender wage gap literature, for instance, this eﬀect has often been used as
a measure for discrimination (Blinder, 1973; Oaxaca, 1973).
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models. Accordingly, the level of financial literacy, Y , can be explained by a given set
of observable characteristics, X, and coeﬃcients,  :
Y = F (X ),
where the mapping function, F (.), can but not need to be linear as long as it is
once diﬀerentiable (Yun, 2004). We estimate a linear probability model in the main
specification and non-linear models as robustness checks. The diﬀerence in financial
literacy, Y , at the first moment between men, A, and women, B, can be summarized
in the following equation:
Y A   Y B = [F (XA A)  F (XB B)] (1)
= [F (XA A)  F (XB A)| {z }
endowment eﬀect
] + [F (XB A)  F (XB B)| {z }
coeﬃcient eﬀect
] (2)
The first part describes the overall endowment eﬀect, whereby the latter indicates
overall diﬀerences in coeﬃcients. Estimating the relative contribution of each variable,
i, to the total gender gap can yield a more detailed picture. Yun (2004) proposes to
calculate weights to the endowments and coeﬃcients eﬀects as follows:
Y A   Y B =
i=KX
i=1
W i X [F (XA A)  F (XB A)] +
i=KX
i=1


























Weights add up exactly to one (100 per cent) and can simply be calculated using
the average values of characteristics and their coeﬃcients (Yun, 2004).10
One caveat of detailed decomposition techniques is linked to categorical regressors.
Usually, in a regression framework one of the categories is chosen to be the base cat-
egory. It is set to zero and all comparisons will be made relative to that category.
Oaxaca and Ransom (1999), however, show that the results of the detailed decompo-
10For non-linear models, however, results are sensitive to the order in which independent variables
enter the decomposition. Yun (2004) proposes a convenient solution for the so-called ‘path de-
pendence’. He obtains weights from a first order Taylor expression to linearise the endowments
and coeﬃcients eﬀects in equation (2) around XA A and XB B .
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sition are not invariant to the choice of the (omitted) base category. We, therefore,
follow the solution by Yun (2008) and normalize the eﬀects for a set of indicator
variables representing one categorical regressor in the model.
5.2. Regression results
Table 7 shows results of multivariate regression analyses. The outcome variable is the
financial literacy index and the main variable of interest is the female dummy. For
ease of interpretation, explanatory variables are collected into groups and separately
introduced into the regression analysis.
Results are in line with Lusardi and Mitchell (2014). Women have significantly lower
financial literacy than men. As for other control variables, age is humped shaped. Fi-
nancial literacy first increases with age and then falls for the elderly. This eﬀect
turns statistically insignificant when adding household composition variables but its
direction remains robust. The number of children in the household may thus be an
alternative measure for being middle aged and absorbs the eﬀect of age. For all spec-
ifications, our results point to a strong and significantly positive relationship between
the ability to write and being financially literate. In contrast, the marital status is in-
significant. Happiness as one measure for well-being is significantly positive associated
with financial literacy. Similarly, albeit only significant in the first model, the depres-
sion scale is negatively correlated with financial literacy; meaning that people who are
less depressed are more likely to be financially literate. The relationship between the
economic status of the household and financial literacy is ambiguous. Even though
the asset index is statistically insignificant, we find that those with higher incomes are
more financially literate. Having children at school-age also increases the probability
of being financially literate. Further, the exposure to financial concepts may vary by
type of occupation and as such drives diﬀerences in financial literacy. Consistent with
this theory, we observe that those in independent occupations have higher financial
literacy than those in dependent occupations. Similar to Aterido et al. (2013), we
interpret mobile phone ownership as a proxy for being more open to new ideas. Even
if we control for household assets, the eﬀect of mobile phone ownership on financial
literacy is positive and statistically significant.
Importantly, the coeﬃcient on the female dummy remains significant and about
the same size as we introduce a large set of additional control variables. This finding
already indicates that the gender gap in financial literacy is not only driven by con-
founding factors, but that other non-observables also drive this gender gap.
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Coeﬃcients in this section were estimated using simple OLS estimations. Hence,
relationships described cannot be interpreted as causal. As a consequence and because
variables that are potentially endogenous in these regressions are not significantly re-
lated to financial literacy, we will focus on only exogenous variables in later analyses.
- set Table 7 about here -
5.3. Decomposition results
Decomposition results are shown in Table 8. Both analyses estimate a linear prob-
ability model with the financial literacy index as outcome variable. The left hand
side of the table does not contain a measure of wealth, whereas the right hand side
does in form of the asset index. The table reports the coeﬃcient estimates along with
percentage shares. Standard errors are cluster-adjusted at the VSLA-level in order to
account for intra-group correlation.
Overall, the mean of the financial literacy index is 2.833 for men and 2.363 for
women. This yields a gender gap of 0.470. The increase of 0.223 indicates that 47
per cent of the gap stems from gender diﬀerences in endowments. The remaining 53
per cent of the financial literacy gender gap can be attributed to gender diﬀerences in
returns on these endowments.
The second and third panel of Table 8 show results of the detailed decomposition.
We see that spelling as a proxy for educational attainment contributes about 18 per
cent to the gender gap in financial literacy. Furthermore, happiness as a measure
of individual well-being also eliminates the gap in financial literacy by 5 per cent.
Though statistically insignificant, improved symptoms of depression would also result
in reduced gender diﬀerences in financial literacy. Further, mobile phone ownership
can significantly reduce the gender gap by about 13 per cent.
The second analysis only diﬀers to the first one by controlling for wealth. We can see
that this specification yields similar results and that mobile phone ownership keeps
its explanatory power. This suggests that mobile phone ownership is not only an-
other wealth measure but indicates something we interpret as openness to new ideas.
Aterido et al. (2013) use a similar line of argumentation in order to explain the lower
usage of formal banking services by women in sub-Saharan Africa.
On the bottom line, this decomposition analysis shows that 47 per cent of the finan-
cial literacy gender gap can be attributed to endowment eﬀects. 21 per cent of this can
particularly be linked to personality traits such as openness (13 per cent), happiness (5
15
per cent), and depression (3 per cent). The finding shows that a large part of the gen-
der gap has its roots in social environments. We argue that the remaining coeﬃcient
eﬀect also captures some of these cultural and societal circumstances in women’s lives
- a point, that is common in the literature on gender gaps in general. Scholars have
argued that gender diﬀerences are broadly consistent with gender stereotypes across
cultures (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1987; American Psychological Association, 1994; Costa Jr
et al., 2001; Thayer et al., 2003). Eagly (2013) explains that perceived diﬀerences be-
tween men and women might result from adoption of gender roles, which predetermine
appropriate conduct for each gender.
- set Table 8 about here -
6. Robustness
This robustness section augment our findings. Results are presented in the online
Appendix.
First, we compare alternative financial literacy measures and confirm a positive re-
lationship between financial literacy and household decision making. Similar to van
Rooij et al. (2011), a financial literacy factor is derived using an iterated principle fac-
tor analysis, followed by the Bartlett method (Bartlett, 1937). The estimated factor
score of the first factor acts as a proxy for financial literacy. We also use a dummy
that is one if the respondent answered all financial literacy questions correctly. In
comparison, Table A.9 shows a positive and mostly significant relationship.
Using probit instead of OLS regressions, we test whether the link between finan-
cial literacy and financial decision making is robust to changes in estimation strategy
(see Table A.10). The marginal eﬀects are slightly smaller but very similar to the
coeﬃcients of the linear probability model in Table 5, which is why we focus on OLS
regressions in further robustness tests.
Further, we control for education instead of using a dummy indicating whether the
person is able to spell a simply word in Kinyarwanda. Several of the questions used
to measure financial literacy require the respondent to calculate percentages and to
understand the principle of compound interest - both of which require more than basic
literacy. That is why we control for educational attainment as robustness analysis,
omitting primary education and less as the base category. Table A.11 strengthens our
results and show that financial literacy remains positively related to decision mak-
ing. As a result, the finding that higher financial literacy increases the likelihood that
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women will participate in household decision making is not only capturing the eﬀect
of educational attainment but rather financial literacy that highly matters.
We diverge from homogeneous eﬀects and estimate the link between financial liter-
acy and financial decision making for diﬀerent sub-samples: (Panel A) only married
women, (Panel B) women who report that they do not have to ask for permission to
attend or travel to a meeting, and (Panel C) those who need permission to do so. Re-
sults in Table A.12 are significant for married women and for women who do not have
to ask for permission. Potentially caused by a small sample, the coeﬃcient is positive
but turns insignificant when looking at women who have to ask for permission.
Next, we augment our IV identification strategy. Tests and first stage results shown
in Table A.13 and Table A.14, respectively, support the validity of our instrument.
We also report results adding a second and commonly used instrument that is border-
line not weak in Table A.8. Table A.15, shows a positive but insignificant correlation
between financial literacy and distance to nearest school, which is why we focus on
the group instrument throughout thus manuscript.
Table A.16 provides further robustness to our IV identification. The first column
shows the original IV estimates. One potential challenge occurs when the group is
only more financially literate because the instrumented individual is more financially
literate. In column two, we aggregate financial literacy on the cell level that is between
village and sector level. It is very unlikely that the average cell level is driven by only
one person. The estimate on the financial decisions index is unchanged. This adds
further support to our claim that the group level influences the individual level.
Another potential threat to our exclusion restriction is that women may not only
learn about finances from the group, but can also adapt their and their husband’s
decision making to other women in the group. Household decision making, however,
is a private process determined by all household members and not only the savings
group member, which leads us to believe it is extremely unlikely that female savings
group members reconfigure their decision-making behaviour because of other female
members. To examine the robustness of our results to this possibility, in column three
we take the group financial literacy average for male members only and use this as
an instrument for woman’s own financial literacy level. Again this alternative identi-
fication leads to no significant change in the estimated eﬀect of financial literacy on
the financial decisions index. The estimate on the expenditure decisions index is still
positive but insignificant. This might be caused by a small sample because male and
female members were randomly selected to enter our sample and men are typically
underrepresented in these groups. Another way to mitigate this concern is to identify
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a sample for whom learning about finances is diﬃcult. The small number of elderly
provide such a sample because the ability to learn new things might decrease with
age. In column four, we see a change in significance, size and sign. Thus, our results
appear robust to these potential challenges.
We also add robustness to the findings in Table 7 and change the measure of finan-
cial literacy. Table A.17 and A.18 show a negative and significant relationship between
the female dummy and financial literacy in all regressions, even after adding further
controls.
Finally as for the decomposition analysis, we show alternative results in Table A.19
using (i) a linear probability model with the financial literacy factor score, and (ii) a
non-linear probability model with the discrete financial literacy dummy.11 These anal-
yses yield similar results as in Table 8.12 If anything, the endowment eﬀect is slightly
reduced in the non-linear specification. A possible reason is that the dummy for only
correct answers captures less variation and is too short-sighted. We also add group
variables such as the age of the group, total number of members, yearly share out, and
the default rate to the decomposition. Table A.20 shows that group characteristics,
however, do not close the gender gap in financial literacy.
7. Conclusion
This article explores the relationship between financial literacy, gender and decision-
making power within the household. Using both OLS and IV regression analyses, we
first study whether financial literacy has an eﬀect on women to participate in decision-
making processes at home. Our findings indicate that women with higher financial
literacy are more likely to report that they are involved in income, credit, investment
and expenditure decisions. This result is consistent with the hypothesis that financial
literacy is a resource of empowerment and enhances women’s involvement in intra-
household decision making.
Motivated by this and to deepen our understanding why women lack behind men
in terms of financial literacy, we examine this gender gap in detail. Using a multi-
variate decomposition technique, we find that about 47 per cent of the gender gap is
explained by diﬀerent endowments between men and women. The largest part of this
is made up of diﬀerences in education and personality traits. 53 per cent of the gap
11For probit decomposition analysis, the mapping function, F (.), is the Cumulative Distribution
Function (CDF) of the standard normal distribution.
12This holds for both in total and in detail. The detailed results can be provided upon request.
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can be attributed to gender diﬀerences in returns on these endowments. Similar to
Bucher-Koenen et al. (2017), Filipiak and Walle (2015) and Grohmann et al. (2016),
we argue that it is reasonable to believe that this coeﬃcient eﬀect captures some of
the societal and cultural circumstances in women’s lives that may hamper them to
achieve higher financial literacy rates.
Clear policy lessons can be drawn from this research. First, it provides motivation to
improve women’s financial literacy, especially in developing countries. The decompo-
sition analysis shows that improved educational levels should result in higher financial
literacy levels. Moreover, a large part of financial literacy diﬀerences between men
and women is associated with personality traits. Financial literacy trainings should,
therefore, take into account gender diﬀerences in personality and tailor content and
delivery methods accordingly. Further, our results inform policymakers by highlight-
ing that personal characteristics contribute about half to the financial literacy gender
gap and that also cultural and societal factors are relevant. It is, therefore, possible
that cross country studies or studies that look at personality traits and gender roles in
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Table 1: Summary statistics of explanatory variables divided by gender
Female Male
Mean SD Mean SD Diﬀerence p-Value
Socio-demographics
Age 43.88 13.39 40.45 13.92  3.431⇤⇤⇤ 0.000
Spell 0.57 0.50 0.72 0.45 0.151⇤⇤⇤ 0.000
Single 0.06 0.24 0.18 0.38 0.113⇤⇤⇤ 0.000
Married 0.67 0.47 0.77 0.42 0.110⇤⇤⇤ 0.000
Widowed 0.20 0.40 0.02 0.15  0.178⇤⇤⇤ 0.000
Divorced 0.07 0.25 0.03 0.16  0.042⇤⇤⇤ 0.006
Happiness 2.76 0.68 2.91 0.62 0.144⇤⇤⇤ 0.001
Depression 0.38 0.49 0.27 0.45  0.110⇤⇤⇤ 0.000
Household
HH size 4.96 1.97 5.05 2.10 0.093 0.465
Children (0-5 years) 0.64 0.79 0.83 0.90 0.191⇤⇤⇤ 0.000
Children (6-12 years) 1.07 1.05 1.05 1.10  0.021 0.757
Children (13-17 years) 0.68 0.92 0.59 0.93  0.087 0.138
Income
Expenditure (Q1) 0.27 0.45 0.17 0.38  0.100⇤⇤⇤ 0.000
Expenditure (Q2) 0.24 0.43 0.28 0.45 0.038 0.172
Expenditure (Q3) 0.25 0.44 0.24 0.43  0.017 0.529
Expenditure (Q4) 0.23 0.42 0.31 0.46 0.080⇤⇤⇤ 0.004
Assets
Assets Index  0.10 1.53 0.35 1.53 0.454⇤⇤⇤ 0.000
Openness
Owns Mobile Phone 0.42 0.49 0.66 0.47 0.241⇤⇤⇤ 0.000
Note: ⇤p < 0.10, ⇤⇤p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤p < 0.01 denote statistical significance.
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Table 2: Summary statistics of decision making divided by gender
Female Male
Mean SD Mean SD Diﬀerence p-Value
Income self 0.41 0.49 0.29 0.45  0.12⇤⇤⇤ 0.000
Income both 0.46 0.50 0.63 0.48 0.18⇤⇤⇤ 0.000
Income spouse 0.11 0.32 0.06 0.24  0.06⇤⇤⇤ 0.004
Income invo 0.87 0.33 0.92 0.27 0.05⇤⇤ 0.011
Credit self 0.41 0.49 0.27 0.44  0.14⇤⇤⇤ 0.000
Credit both 0.55 0.50 0.69 0.46 0.14⇤⇤⇤ 0.000
Credit spouse 0.03 0.17 0.03 0.16  0.00 0.799
Credit invo 0.96 0.19 0.96 0.19  0.00 0.936
Invest self 0.42 0.49 0.27 0.45  0.15⇤⇤⇤ 0.000
Invest both 0.51 0.50 0.66 0.47 0.15⇤⇤⇤ 0.000
Invest spouse 0.05 0.22 0.03 0.18  0.02 0.182
Invest invo 0.93 0.25 0.93 0.25  0.00 0.805
Food self 0.58 0.49 0.25 0.43  0.33⇤⇤⇤ 0.000
Food both 0.36 0.48 0.50 0.50 0.14⇤⇤⇤ 0.000
Food spouse 0.05 0.21 0.21 0.41 0.16⇤⇤⇤ 0.000
Food invo 0.93 0.25 0.74 0.44  0.19⇤⇤⇤ 0.000
Own health self 0.63 0.48 0.56 0.50  0.07⇤⇤ 0.035
Own health both 0.31 0.46 0.37 0.48 0.05⇤ 0.071
Own health spouse 0.05 0.21 0.06 0.24 0.01 0.448
Own health invo 0.94 0.23 0.93 0.25  0.01 0.443
Own clothes self 0.61 0.49 0.56 0.50  0.05 0.141
Own clothes both 0.33 0.47 0.39 0.49 0.05⇤ 0.068
Own clothes spouse 0.05 0.22 0.04 0.20  0.01 0.429
Own clothes invo 0.94 0.23 0.95 0.21 0.01 0.518
Energy self 0.50 0.50 0.33 0.47  0.17⇤⇤⇤ 0.000
Energy both 0.36 0.48 0.47 0.50 0.11⇤⇤⇤ 0.001
Energy spouse 0.12 0.32 0.17 0.37 0.05⇤⇤ 0.026
Energy invo 0.86 0.35 0.80 0.40  0.06⇤⇤⇤ 0.005
Child’s health self 0.42 0.49 0.12 0.33  0.30⇤⇤⇤ 0.000
Child’s health both 0.54 0.50 0.81 0.40 0.27⇤⇤⇤ 0.000
Child’s health spouse 0.04 0.20 0.06 0.24 0.02 0.137
Child’s health invo 0.95 0.21 0.93 0.26  0.02 0.124
Child’s clothes self 0.45 0.50 0.13 0.34  0.32⇤⇤⇤ 0.000
Child’s clothes both 0.51 0.50 0.77 0.42 0.26⇤⇤⇤ 0.000
Child’s clothes spouse 0.04 0.19 0.09 0.29 0.05⇤⇤⇤ 0.000
Child’s clothes invo 0.96 0.20 0.90 0.30  0.06⇤⇤⇤ 0.000
Observations 1081 324 1405
Note: ⇤p < 0.10, ⇤⇤p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤p < 0.01 denote statistical significance.
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Table 3: Distribution of financial literacy questions divided by gender
Female (%) Male (%) Total (%)
Compound interest
Less than RWF 10.200 7.68 6.48 7.40
Exactly RWF 10.200 5.64 2.16 4.84
More than RWF 10.200 (correct) 60.78 76.85 64.48
Don’t know 25.90 14.51 23.27
Inflation
Less (correct) 56.24 66.67 58.65
Same 3.70 4.01 3.77
More 17.58 19.14 17.94
Don’t know 22.48 10.19 19.64
Risk diversification
One crop 25.44 20.06 24.20
Multiple crops (correct) 73.27 78.70 74.52
Don’t know 1.30 1.23 1.28
Borrowing decision
RWF 60.000 32.93 28.09 31.81
RWF 50.000 + 15% (correct) 45.33 61.11 48.97
Don’t know 21.74 10.80 19.22
Cross-question consistency
Wrong: Interest and Inflation 55.23 42.59 52.31
Correct: Interest and Inflation 44.77 57.41 47.69
Note: The table shows results on each financial literacy question.
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Table 4: Distribution of financial literacy questions divided by gender - extended
Female Male
Freq. Prop. Freq. Prop. Diﬀerence p-Value
All questions correct 234 0.2165 110 0.3395  0.1230⇤⇤⇤ 0.0000
Zero correct answers 75 0.0694 11 0.0340 0.0354⇤⇤ 0.0196
At least one don’t know 375 0.3469 60 0.1852 0.1617⇤⇤⇤ 0.0000
All don’t know 6 0.0056 0 0.0000 0.0055 0.1792
Total Obs. 1081 324
Female Male
Mean SD Mean SD Diﬀerence p-Value
FL Index 2.3562 1.2217 2.8333 1.2253  0.4772⇤⇤⇤ 0.0000
FL Factor Score -0.1092 1.2628 0.3644 1.1284  0.4736⇤⇤⇤ 0.0000
FL Dummy 0.2165 0.4120 0.3395 0.4743  0.1230⇤⇤⇤ 0.0000
Note: ⇤p < 0.10, ⇤⇤p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤p < 0.01 denote statistical significance.
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Table 5: OLS results of financial literacy on decision making











  / SE   / SE   / SE   / SE   / SE
Financial literacy 0.020** 0.012** 0.017** 0.048*** 0.075**
(0.009) (0.005) (0.007) (0.016) (0.033)
Controls
Age 0.012* 0.009** 0.015*** 0.035** 0.039*
(0.007) (0.004) (0.005) (0.014) (0.023)
Age2  0.000  0.000**  0.000**  0.000**  0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Spell 0.028  0.000 0.011 0.023 0.099
(0.025) (0.015) (0.018) (0.047) (0.089)
Married  0.021  0.020  0.107***  0.150** 0.015
(0.046) (0.024) (0.032) (0.076) (0.249)
Widowed 0.085* 0.004  0.075** 0.011 0.321
(0.050) (0.025) (0.033) (0.082) (0.252)
Divorced 0.116**  0.010  0.069** 0.028 0.301
(0.047) (0.030) (0.035) (0.088) (0.269)
HH size  0.022**  0.005  0.016**  0.043***  0.051
(0.009) (0.004) (0.006) (0.014) (0.038)
Children (0-5 years) 0.026 0.011 0.020 0.054* 0.048
(0.018) (0.009) (0.013) (0.028) (0.047)
Children (6-12 years) 0.015  0.007 0.022** 0.031 0.061
(0.012) (0.008) (0.010) (0.023) (0.040)
Children (13-17 years) 0.012 0.003 0.010 0.023 0.044
(0.014) (0.006) (0.009) (0.020) (0.037)
Expenditure (Q2) 0.044* 0.007 0.022 0.063 0.087
(0.024) (0.015) (0.020) (0.047) (0.104)
Expenditure (Q3) 0.011  0.008  0.000  0.006  0.012
(0.031) (0.019) (0.023) (0.059) (0.113)
Expenditure (Q4) 0.038 0.006  0.016 0.026 0.105
(0.031) (0.019) (0.026) (0.058) (0.108)
Asset index  0.008 0.000 0.003  0.005  0.037
(0.008) (0.004) (0.006) (0.013) (0.025)
Observations 1057 1057 1033 1033 859
R2 0.063 0.025 0.042 0.063 0.062
Notes: The table reports coeﬃcients of multivariate regressions with standard errors clustered at VSLA level in
brackets. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 denote statistical significance.
Outcome variables in columns 1-3 are indicator variables equal to one if a woman has decision-making power
in a given category. The index in column 4 counts the number of financial decisions (columns 1-3) women are
involved in. The index in column 5 counts the number of expenditure decisions (indicator variables are shown in
the Appendix).
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Table 6: IV results of financial literacy on decision making











  / SE   / SE   / SE   / SE   / SE
Financial literacy 0.059* 0.028 0.063** 0.142** 0.328***
(0.033) (0.018) (0.029) (0.064) (0.124)
Controls
Age 0.012* 0.009** 0.015*** 0.034** 0.037
(0.006) (0.004) (0.005) (0.013) (0.024)
Age2  0.000  0.000**  0.000**  0.000**  0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Spell 0.005  0.009  0.017  0.035  0.053
(0.030) (0.017) (0.025) (0.057) (0.118)
Married  0.013  0.017  0.096***  0.128* 0.047
(0.046) (0.023) (0.033) (0.076) (0.251)
Widowed 0.097* 0.009  0.058* 0.046 0.392
(0.052) (0.024) (0.033) (0.086) (0.262)
Divorced 0.129***  0.005  0.052 0.064 0.364
(0.048) (0.029) (0.034) (0.089) (0.274)
HH size  0.022**  0.005  0.015**  0.042***  0.056
(0.009) (0.004) (0.006) (0.014) (0.039)
Children (0-5 years) 0.024 0.010 0.018 0.049* 0.039
(0.018) (0.009) (0.013) (0.028) (0.052)
Children (6-12 years) 0.013  0.008 0.019* 0.025 0.052
(0.012) (0.008) (0.010) (0.024) (0.042)
Children (13-17 years) 0.011 0.002 0.008 0.020 0.040
(0.014) (0.006) (0.009) (0.020) (0.041)
Expenditure (Q2) 0.037 0.004 0.013 0.046 0.045
(0.025) (0.016) (0.021) (0.049) (0.105)
Expenditure (Q3)  0.004  0.014  0.017  0.041  0.102
(0.033) (0.020) (0.028) (0.064) (0.121)
Expenditure (Q4) 0.028 0.002  0.028 0.002 0.041
(0.032) (0.019) (0.027) (0.060) (0.108)
Asset index  0.008 0.000 0.003  0.006  0.035
(0.008) (0.004) (0.006) (0.014) (0.025)
Observations 1057 1057 1033 1033 859
R2 0.046 0.015  0.002 0.029  0.027
F-Statistic 61.228 61.228 57.894 57.894 52.532
Notes: The table reports coeﬃcients of instrumental variable regressions with standard errors clustered at VSLA
level in brackets. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 denote statistical significance.
Outcome variables in columns 1-3 are indicator variables equal to one if a woman has decision-making power in a
given category. The index in column 4 counts the number of financial decisions (columns 1-3) a woman is involved
in. The index in column 5 counts the number of expenditure decisions a woman is involved in (indicator variables
are shown in the Appendix).
The instrument used is the average group index of financial literacy excluding the individual considered.
30
Table 7: OLS results on financial literacy
  / SE   / SE   / SE   / SE   / SE
Sociodemographics
Female  0.295***  0.292***  0.270***  0.303***  0.278***
(0.070) (0.070) (0.071) (0.070) (0.071)
Age 0.030** 0.026* 0.014 0.015 0.015
(0.014) (0.014) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017)
Age2  0.000***  0.000**  0.000  0.000  0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Spell 0.622*** 0.571*** 0.574*** 0.552*** 0.511***
(0.073) (0.074) (0.074) (0.073) (0.075)
Married 0.045  0.030  0.163  0.144  0.120
(0.118) (0.118) (0.124) (0.122) (0.123)
Widowed  0.166  0.156  0.248  0.226  0.221
(0.153) (0.155) (0.166) (0.164) (0.166)
Divorced  0.053  0.066  0.180  0.127  0.120
(0.166) (0.164) (0.168) (0.161) (0.162)
Happiness 0.168*** 0.138** 0.147*** 0.140** 0.140**
(0.054) (0.056) (0.056) (0.055) (0.055)
Depression  0.115*  0.091  0.097  0.072  0.072
(0.068) (0.069) (0.069) (0.069) (0.068)
Income
Expenditure (Q2) 0.158* 0.158* 0.140 0.132
(0.094) (0.094) (0.092) (0.092)
Expenditure (Q3) 0.327*** 0.312*** 0.264*** 0.243**
(0.093) (0.094) (0.094) (0.095)
Expenditure (Q4) 0.216** 0.201** 0.104 0.075
(0.099) (0.100) (0.101) (0.102)
Assets
Asset index 0.034 0.034 0.017  0.006
(0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.024)
Household
HH size  0.015  0.019  0.017
(0.025) (0.026) (0.026)
Children (0-5 years) 0.067 0.070 0.071
(0.043) (0.043) (0.043)
Children (6-12 years) 0.083** 0.092** 0.094**
(0.038) (0.037) (0.037)
Children (13-17 years) 0.044 0.045 0.039
(0.044) (0.044) (0.044)
Employment
Civil servant 0.301 0.291
(0.271) (0.263)
Indep. occupation 0.178*** 0.173**
(0.068) (0.068)













Observations 1401 1380 1371 1371 1371
R2 0.159 0.170 0.174 0.197 0.201
Notes: The table reports coeﬃcients of multivariate regressions with standard errors clustered at VSLA level in
brackets. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 denote statistical significance.
The outcome variable is the financial literacy index which is generated by giving one point for each financial
literacy question answered correctly. Happiness and Depression are scores on a scale designed to measure mental
well-being.
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Table 8: Full decomposition results of financial literacy
without Assets with Assets
Coeﬃcient Share Coeﬃcient Share
Overall
Male 2.833⇤⇤⇤ Male 2.833⇤⇤⇤
Female 2.363⇤⇤⇤ Female 2.363⇤⇤⇤
Diﬀerence 0.470⇤⇤⇤ 100.000 Diﬀerence 0.470⇤⇤⇤ 100.000
Endowment Eﬀ. 0.223⇤⇤⇤ 47.331 Endowment Eﬀ. 0.223⇤⇤⇤ 47.403
Coeﬃcient Eﬀ. 0.248⇤⇤⇤ 52.669 Coeﬃcient Eﬀ. 0.247⇤⇤⇤ 52.597
Endowment Eﬀ.
Age  0.053  11.208 Age  0.050  10.685
Age2 0.064 13.612 Age2 0.063 13.290
Single 0.008 1.614 Single 0.008 1.701
Married 0.006 1.286 Married 0.005 1.054
Divorced 0.001 0.156 Divorced 0.001 0.129
Widowed 0.019 4.017 Widowed 0.018 3.878
Spell 0.084⇤⇤⇤ 17.878 Spell 0.084⇤⇤⇤ 17.771
Children (6-12)  0.001  0.247 Children (6-12)  0.001  0.245
Happy 0.023⇤ 4.961 Happy 0.023⇤ 4.825
Depression 0.013 2.720 Depression 0.013 2.659
Mobile phone 0.059⇤⇤ 12.542 Mobile phone 0.053⇤⇤ 11.280
Asset index 0.008 1.747
Coeﬃcient Eﬀ.
Age 1.313 279.224 Age 0.912 193.894
Age2  0.614  130.616 Age2  0.461  98.103
Single  0.029  6.229 Single  0.026  5.565
Married  0.033  7.027 Married  0.052  11.065
Divorced 0.016 3.457 Divorced 0.018 3.844
Widowed  0.005  1.011 Widowed  0.005  1.045
Spell 0.048 10.231 Spell 0.008 1.650
Children (6-12) 0.034 7.276 Children (6-12) 0.029 6.201
Happy  0.460  97.848 Happy  0.566  120.427
Depression  0.032  6.757 Depression  0.024  5.024
Mobile phone 0.035 7.513 Mobile phone  0.084  17.827
Asset index 0.034⇤ 7.203
Constant  0.026  5.542 Constant 0.465 98.862
Notes: ⇤p < 0.10, ⇤⇤p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤p < 0.01 denote statistical significance.
Due to rounding shares may not add up.
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Figure 1: Gender diﬀerences in financial literacy
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A. Online Appendix
Online Appendix to complement:
Financial literacy and Intra-household Decision Making: Evidence from Rwanda
not intended for publication in main text
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Table A.1: Distribution of financial literacy responses by socio-demographics
Compound interest Inflation Risk-diversification Borrowing
Correct DK Correct DK Correct DK Correct DK
Age
<35 72.61 15.43 63.48 11.96 74.57 1.09 56.96 10.65
35 - 54 67.03 20.66 62.46 16.56 73.82 1.10 50.16 17.19
55 - 64 53.88 34.25 43.84 34.25 77.17 0.91 38.36 29.68
65 + 31.52 54.35 43.48 44.57 72.83 4.35 26.09 51.09
Gender
Female 60.78 25.90 56.24 22.48 73.27 1.30 45.33 21.74
Male 76.85 14.51 66.67 10.19 78.70 1.23 61.11 10.80
Education
Primary and less 63.69 23.89 59.18 19.47 75.34 1.11 48.38 19.56
Secondary and more 87.50 1.92 78.85 2.88 83.65 0.96 58.65 6.73
Other 60.61 33.33 48.48 21.21 75.76 0.00 54.55 12.12
Marital status
Single 75.20 14.40 53.60 12.00 76.00 1.60 64.80 8.80
Widowed 46.64 40.81 43.50 35.43 70.85 1.79 30.94 38.57
Divorced 57.14 29.19 48.81 26.19 63.10 1.19 55.95 20.24
Married 67.73 20.21 63.71 16.49 76.08 1.13 50.52 15.98
Employment
Farmer (indep.) 63.40 23.73 57.54 20.46 73.49 1.34 47.74 19.98
Independent 73.51 16.79 67.16 12.69 79.85 0.75 54.58 13.81
occupation
Dependent 46.88 39.06 37.50 31.25 70.31 1.56 46.88 28.13
occupation
Without 28.57 71.43 14.29 85.71 71.43 14.29 28.57 71.43
occupation
Note: The acronym DK stands for ‘Don’t know’.
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Table A.2: OLS results for women’s sole decision making











  / SE   / SE   / SE   / SE   / SE
Financial literacy (no controls)  0.065***  0.072***  0.067***  0.204***  0.197***
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.035) (0.071)
Observations 1081 1081 1054 1054 877
R2 0.026 0.032 0.027 0.031 0.009
Financial literacy (controls)  0.002  0.013  0.009  0.020 0.065
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.024) (0.058)
Observations 1057 1057 1033 1033 859
R2 0.559 0.589 0.550 0.628 0.425
Notes: The table reports coeﬃcients of multivariate regressions with standard errors clustered at VSLA level in
brackets. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 denote statistical significance.
Outcome variables in columns 1-3 are indicator variables equal to one if a woman has sole decision-making power
in a given category. The index in column 4 counts the number of financial decisions (columns 1-3) a woman decides
alone. The index in column 5 counts the number of expenditure decisions a woman decides alone.
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Table A.3: OLS results for expenditure decisions















  / SE   / SE   / SE   / SE   / SE   / SE
Financial literacy 0.015** 0.018*** 0.014** 0.015* 0.005 0.006
(0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.009) (0.007) (0.007)
Controls
Age 0.018*** 0.012** 0.008** 0.022*** 0.011* 0.010
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007)
Age2  0.000***  0.000**  0.000  0.000***  0.000  0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Spell 0.017  0.009 0.007 0.045* 0.014 0.013
(0.018) (0.018) (0.017) (0.026) (0.019) (0.018)
Married 0.100*  0.019  0.077** 0.022 0.020  0.010
(0.053) (0.043) (0.037) (0.057) (0.051) (0.044)
Widowed 0.131** 0.026  0.042 0.139** 0.048 0.023
(0.052) (0.043) (0.039) (0.061) (0.050) (0.046)
Divorced 0.130** 0.038  0.036 0.149** 0.047  0.000
(0.053) (0.041) (0.040) (0.058) (0.051) (0.049)
HH size  0.020***  0.008  0.003  0.023**  0.011  0.006
(0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.009) (0.007) (0.006)
Children (0-5 years) 0.016 0.006 0.013 0.023 0.011 0.006
(0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (0.016) (0.010) (0.010)
Children (6-12 years) 0.014 0.007 0.008 0.021* 0.003 0.005
(0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.012) (0.008) (0.009)
Children (13-17 years) 0.010 0.001 0.015** 0.003  0.001 0.003
(0.009) (0.009) (0.007) (0.015) (0.008) (0.007)
Expenditure (Q2) 0.018 0.037* 0.023 0.009 0.015  0.012
(0.020) (0.020) (0.019) (0.029) (0.020) (0.020)
Expenditure (Q3) 0.018 0.020  0.011  0.001 0.003  0.018
(0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.029) (0.022) (0.021)
Expenditure (Q4) 0.011 0.019 0.009 0.010 0.031 0.020
(0.024) (0.024) (0.022) (0.032) (0.022) (0.019)
Asset index  0.001 0.004  0.008  0.014  0.003 0.000
(0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.009) (0.006) (0.005)
Observations 1056 1057 1057 1055 863 862
R2 0.081 0.040 0.043 0.077 0.023 0.022
Notes: The table reports coeﬃcients of multivariate regressions with standard errors clustered at VSLA level in
brackets. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 denote statistical significance.
Outcome variables in columns 1-6 are indicator variables equal to one if a woman has decision-making power in
a given category.
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Table A.4: Group IV results for expenditure decisions















  / SE   / SE   / SE   / SE   / SE   / SE
Financial literacy 0.029 0.058** 0.074** 0.069 0.045* 0.052**
(0.026) (0.026) (0.030) (0.043) (0.026) (0.025)
Controls
Age 0.018*** 0.012** 0.008* 0.022*** 0.011 0.009
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007)
Age2  0.000***  0.000*  0.000  0.000***  0.000  0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Spell 0.009  0.033  0.029 0.013  0.011  0.015
(0.023) (0.025) (0.025) (0.035) (0.024) (0.023)
Married 0.103*  0.010  0.065* 0.033 0.025  0.003
(0.053) (0.043) (0.038) (0.057) (0.050) (0.044)
Widowed 0.136** 0.039  0.022 0.156** 0.059 0.036
(0.053) (0.044) (0.042) (0.065) (0.052) (0.047)
Divorced 0.134** 0.051  0.016 0.166*** 0.057 0.012
(0.053) (0.042) (0.041) (0.059) (0.052) (0.049)
HH size  0.020***  0.008  0.002  0.023**  0.012  0.007
(0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.009) (0.007) (0.007)
Children (0-5 years) 0.015 0.004 0.010 0.020 0.010 0.005
(0.012) (0.013) (0.011) (0.017) (0.011) (0.010)
Children (6-12 years) 0.013 0.005 0.004 0.018 0.002 0.003
(0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.012) (0.008) (0.009)
Children (13-17 years) 0.010  0.000 0.014* 0.001  0.002 0.002
(0.009) (0.010) (0.008) (0.015) (0.008) (0.007)
Expenditure (Q2) 0.016 0.029 0.012  0.001 0.008  0.020
(0.021) (0.020) (0.018) (0.029) (0.021) (0.021)
Expenditure (Q3) 0.013 0.005  0.035  0.022  0.011  0.035
(0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.031) (0.025) (0.023)
Expenditure (Q4) 0.007 0.008  0.007  0.004 0.021 0.009
(0.024) (0.024) (0.021) (0.033) (0.022) (0.020)
Asset index  0.001 0.004  0.009  0.015*  0.003 0.000
(0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.009) (0.005) (0.005)
Observations 1056 1057 1057 1055 863 862
R2 0.077 0.000  0.047 0.046  0.026  0.050
F-Statistic 61.428 61.228 61.228 62.331 51.035 51.391
Notes: The table reports coeﬃcients of instrumental variable regressions with standard errors clustered at VSLA
level in brackets. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 denote statistical significance.
Outcome variables in columns 1-6 are indicator variables equal to one if a woman has decision-making power in
a given category.
The instrument used is the average group index of financial literacy excluding the individual considered.
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Table A.5: Financial literacy and urban characteristics
Individual level Group level
  / SE   / SE
Distance to market 0.159 0.132
(0.136) (0.148)
Distance to sector oﬃce 0.281 0.315
(0.299) (0.320)
Distance to school 0.031 0.078
(0.153) (0.171)
Distance to health centre  0.002 0.053
(0.145) (0.154)
Distance to taxi  0.281  0.283
(0.179) (0.195)
Distance to SACCO 0.092 0.084
(0.354) (0.379)




Notes: The table shows beta coeﬃcients of multivariate regression results with standard errors clustered at the
sector level in brackets. The outcome variable is the financial literacy index which is generated by giving one point
for each financial literacy question answered correctly. The individual level displays the results for the variable used
as IV (group cluster average excluding the respondent). The group level displays the results for the group average
including all selected group respondents. The distance variables are sector means of binary variables stating 0 if
the corresponding object is more than 30 minutes away and 1 if the corresponding object is less than 30 minutes
away from the household. This information has been gathered from the second FinScope survey in 2012 (FinScope,
2013). * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 denote statistical significance.
Table A.6: Comparing high and low financially literate groups
Overall High FL Low FL Regression p-Value
Mean Mean Mean Diﬀerence
Demographics
Age 43.88 43.75 44.34  0.58 0.59
Age squared 2104.95 2092.56 2148.00  55.44 0.59
Spell 0.57 0.58 0.52 0.07 0.10
Single 0.06 0.07 0.05 0.02 0.32
Married 0.67 0.67 0.66 0.01 0.89
Widowed 0.20 0.20 0.21  0.01 0.78
Divorced 0.07 0.07 0.08  0.01 0.53
Household
HH size 4.97 4.91 5.15  0.24 0.17
Children (0-5 years) 0.64 0.62 0.73  0.11 0.04
Children (6-12 years) 1.07 1.07 1.09  0.02 0.76
Children (13-17 years) 0.68 0.66 0.72  0.06 0.41
Wealth
Expenditure (Q1) 0.27 0.26 0.32  0.06 0.16
Expenditure (Q2) 0.24 0.25 0.22 0.03 0.41
Expenditure (Q3) 0.25 0.27 0.19 0.08 0.01
Expenditure (Q4) 0.23 0.22 0.27  0.05 0.20
Assets Index  0.10  0.13  0.03  0.10 0.45























































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table A.8: OLS and IV results comparison
Financial literacy as variable of interest
Financial decisions index (N = 1033) Expenditure decisions index (N = 859)
No FE FE No FE FE
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Single equation model 0.048⇤⇤⇤ 0.034⇤ 0.075⇤⇤ 0.023
(OLS) (0.016) (0.020) (0.033) (0.036)
Two equation models
Excluded instruments
Group average 0.142⇤⇤ 0.031⇤ 0.328⇤⇤⇤ 0.022
(0.064) (0.017) (0.124) (0.029)
[52.41] [151072.85] [51.00] [145161.07]
Group average and 0.146⇤⇤ 0.035⇤⇤ 0.302⇤⇤ 0.025
distance (0.065) (0.017) (0.123) (0.030)
[25.48] [71814.33] [25.63] [68526.62]
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. ⇤p < 0.10, ⇤⇤p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤p < 0.01 denote statistical significance. F
statistics of weak identification test in brackets.
Table A.9: OLS results with alternative financial literacy measures











  / SE   / SE   / SE   / SE   / SE
FL Index 0.020** 0.012** 0.017** 0.048*** 0.075**
(0.009) (0.005) (0.007) (0.016) (0.033)
Observations 1057 1057 1033 1033 859
R2 0.063 0.025 0.042 0.063 0.062
FL Factor Score 0.013 0.009** 0.017** 0.039** 0.041
(0.008) (0.005) (0.006) (0.015) (0.030)
Observations 1057 1057 1033 1033 859
R2 0.061 0.022 0.042 0.060 0.057
FL Dummy 0.050** 0.020 0.040** 0.108** 0.182**
(0.025) (0.013) (0.017) (0.043) (0.079)
Observations 1057 1057 1033 1033 859
R2 0.063 0.021 0.041 0.060 0.060
Notes: The table reports coeﬃcients of multivariate regressions with standard errors clustered at VSLA level in
brackets. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 denote statistical significance.
Outcome variables in columns 1-3 are indicator variables equal to one if a woman has decision-making power in a
given category. The index in column 4 counts the number of financial decisions (columns 1-3) a woman is involved
in. The index in column 5 counts the number of expenditure decisions a woman is involved in.
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Mfx / SE Mfx / SE Mfx / SE
Financial literacy 0.017** 0.008*** 0.015***
(0.043) (0.063) (0.054)
Controls
Age 0.010 0.006*** 0.012***
(0.038) (0.042) (0.034)
Age2  0.000  0.000***  0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Spell 0.023 0.001 0.008
(0.125) (0.209) (0.145)
Married  0.030  0.018  0.106***
(0.205) (0.312) (0.338)
Widowed 0.138** 0.028  0.066*
(0.347) (0.441) (0.394)
Divorced 0.173**  0.011  0.074*
(0.434) (0.422) (0.418)
HH size  0.019***  0.004  0.014***
(0.042) (0.053) (0.042)
Children (0-5 years) 0.020 0.007 0.017
(0.084) (0.122) (0.104)
Children (6-12 years) 0.012  0.005 0.018**
(0.061) (0.092) (0.075)
Children (13-17 years) 0.009 0.001 0.009
(0.071) (0.086) (0.077)
Expenditure (Q2) 0.038 0.003 0.013
(0.145) (0.239) (0.192)
Expenditure (Q3) 0.003  0.006  0.006
(0.160) (0.248) (0.194)
Expenditure (Q4) 0.030 0.003  0.017
(0.155) (0.260) (0.197)
Asset index  0.005 0.000 0.004
(0.039) (0.055) (0.045)
Observations 1057 1057 1033
Pseudo R2 0.107 0.095 0.089
Notes: The table reports marginal eﬀects of probit regressions with standard errors clustered at VSLA level in
brackets. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 denote statistical significance.
Outcome variables in columns 1-3 are indicator variables equal to one if a woman has decision-making power in
a given category.
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Table A.11: OLS results with education instead of ability to spell a simple word











  / SE   / SE   / SE   / SE   / SE
Financial literacy 0.017** 0.012** 0.018*** 0.044*** 0.083***
(0.008) (0.005) (0.007) (0.015) (0.031)
Controls
Age 0.015** 0.012** 0.017*** 0.043*** 0.044*
(0.008) (0.005) (0.006) (0.016) (0.026)
Age2  0.000*  0.000**  0.000***  0.000**  0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Secondary education and more 0.090***  0.009 0.017 0.090 0.126
(0.032) (0.024) (0.032) (0.064) (0.124)
Married  0.014  0.021  0.115***  0.151* 0.037
(0.046) (0.025) (0.034) (0.079) (0.261)
Widowed 0.078 0.002  0.082**  0.005 0.325
(0.050) (0.026) (0.035) (0.085) (0.265)
Divorced 0.104**  0.015  0.079** 0.002 0.282
(0.047) (0.032) (0.037) (0.092) (0.286)
HH size  0.024***  0.006  0.017**  0.047***  0.056
(0.009) (0.005) (0.006) (0.015) (0.039)
Children (0-5 years) 0.023 0.010 0.021 0.051* 0.041
(0.018) (0.009) (0.014) (0.028) (0.046)
Children (6-12 years) 0.020*  0.007 0.022** 0.036 0.068*
(0.012) (0.009) (0.011) (0.024) (0.040)
Children (13-17 years) 0.018 0.000 0.009 0.025 0.063
(0.014) (0.006) (0.009) (0.021) (0.039)
Expenditure (Q2) 0.037 0.006 0.024 0.053 0.124
(0.025) (0.016) (0.021) (0.048) (0.105)
Expenditure (Q3) 0.003  0.001 0.010  0.000  0.008
(0.031) (0.018) (0.023) (0.055) (0.111)
Expenditure (Q4) 0.015 0.009  0.016 0.003 0.070
(0.032) (0.018) (0.027) (0.058) (0.110)
Asset index  0.008 0.002 0.005  0.002  0.026
(0.008) (0.004) (0.006) (0.014) (0.026)
Observations 981 981 957 957 803
R2 0.062 0.027 0.045 0.062 0.063
Notes: The table reports coeﬃcients of multivariate regressions with standard errors clustered at VSLA level in
brackets. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 denote statistical significance.
Outcome variables in columns 1-3 are indicator variables equal to one if a woman has decision-making power in a
given category. The index in column 4 counts the number of financial decisions (columns 1-3) women are involved
in. The index in column 5 counts the number of expenditure decisions.
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Table A.12: OLS results using diﬀerent sub-samples
Panel A: Only married women











  / SE   / SE   / SE   / SE   / SE
Financial literacy 0.016 0.014** 0.021** 0.051** 0.087**
(0.012) (0.007) (0.009) (0.023) (0.043)
Observations 705 705 686 686 632
R2 0.019 0.017 0.043 0.027 0.039
Panel B: Travel or attend meetings without permission











  / SE   / SE   / SE   / SE   / SE
Financial literacy 0.028*** 0.012** 0.013* 0.052*** 0.050
(0.010) (0.006) (0.007) (0.018) (0.039)
Observations 510 510 506 506 385
R2 0.128 0.051 0.038 0.096 0.091
Panel C: Travel or attend meetings only with permission











  / SE   / SE   / SE   / SE   / SE
Financial literacy 0.028 0.013 0.018 0.060 0.101
(0.017) (0.012) (0.015) (0.036) (0.069)
Observations 387 387 376 376 335
R2 0.064 0.042 0.065 0.064 0.064
Notes: The table reports coeﬃcients of multivariate regressions with standard errors clustered at VSLA level in
brackets. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 denote statistical significance.
Outcome variables in columns 1-3 are indicator variables equal to one if a woman has decision-making power in a
given category. The index in column 4 counts the number of financial decisions (columns 1-3) a woman is involved
in. The index in column 5 counts the number of expenditure decisions a woman is involved in.
Table A.13: Summary of the empirical power of the instrument(s)
Financial decisions Expenditure decisions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Group average Group average Group average Group average
& Distance & Distance
All women
Weak instrument testa 3 3 3 3
Over-identification testb 3 3
Exogeneity testc 3 3 7 3
Married women
Weak instrument testa 3 3 3 3
Over-identification testb 3 3
Exogeneity testc 3 7 3 3
Notes: a 3 indicates that the joint F-statistic for the excluded instruments in the first stage equation is greater than
10; 7 indicates that it is not. b 3 indicates that we do not reject the over-identification test at the 0.05 significance
level; 7 indicates that we reject the test. c 3 indicates that we do not reject exogeneity at the 0.05 significance
level; 7 indicates that we reject the test.
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Children (0-5 years) 0.045
(0.052)
Children (6-12 years) 0.050
(0.042)












Notes: The table reports regression results for the first stage of the group IV regression. *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p
< 0.01 denote statistical significance. The outcome variable is the financial literacy index which is generated by
giving one point for each financial literacy question answered correctly.
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Children (0-5 years) 0.029
(0.056)
Children (6-12 years) 0.051
(0.044)












Notes: The table reports regression results for the first stage of the group IV regression. *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p
< 0.01 denote statistical significance. The outcome variable is the financial literacy index which is generated by
giving one point for each financial literacy question answered correctly.
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Table A.16: Additional robustness for group IV
Original IV Cell IV Male Placebo:
IV group average group Only
average average elderly
Financial decisions index
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Financial 0.142⇤⇤ 0.174⇤⇤ 0.152⇤  0.376
literacy (0.064) (0.086) (0.092) (0.336)
R2 0.029 0.002 0.039  0.075
Weak ident. (F Stat) 52.41 34.36 20.09 3.46
Obs. 1033 1033 591 38
Expenditure decisions index
(5) (6) (7) (8)
Financial 0.328⇤⇤⇤ 0.120 0.216  0.245
literacy (0.124) (0.148) (0.190) (0.188)
R2  0.027 0.059 0.024 0.497
Weak ident. (F Stat) 51.00 32.28 15.85 3.35
Obs. 859 859 495 17
Notes: Standard errors clustered at VSLA level in parentheses. ⇤p < 0.10, ⇤⇤p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤p < 0.01 denote statistical
significance.
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Table A.17: OLS results on FL Factor Score
  / SE   / SE   / SE   / SE   / SE
Sociodemographics
Female  0.294***  0.296***  0.273***  0.305***  0.278***
(0.074) (0.075) (0.075) (0.075) (0.076)
Age 0.023 0.019 0.004 0.005 0.005
(0.014) (0.014) (0.017) (0.018) (0.018)
Age2  0.000**  0.000**  0.000  0.000  0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Spell 0.676*** 0.634*** 0.636*** 0.617*** 0.571***
(0.074) (0.074) (0.075) (0.074) (0.076)
Married 0.132 0.066  0.077  0.059  0.032
(0.115) (0.114) (0.118) (0.115) (0.115)
Widowed  0.061  0.050  0.140  0.117  0.112
(0.153) (0.155) (0.165) (0.163) (0.165)
Divorced 0.084 0.066  0.054  0.006 0.002
(0.166) (0.165) (0.169) (0.161) (0.162)
Happiness 0.183*** 0.150** 0.161*** 0.154*** 0.154***
(0.057) (0.058) (0.058) (0.058) (0.057)
Depression  0.029  0.010  0.016 0.006 0.007
(0.071) (0.072) (0.073) (0.072) (0.072)
Income
Expenditure (Q2) 0.147 0.148 0.133 0.125
(0.093) (0.093) (0.092) (0.092)
Expenditure (Q3) 0.310*** 0.294*** 0.256** 0.231**
(0.099) (0.099) (0.099) (0.101)
Expenditure (Q4) 0.206* 0.187* 0.110 0.077
(0.105) (0.105) (0.106) (0.106)
Assets
Asset index 0.022 0.021 0.006  0.019
(0.024) (0.025) (0.024) (0.026)
Household
HH size  0.017  0.022  0.020
(0.026) (0.027) (0.027)
Children (0-5 years) 0.070* 0.073* 0.074*
(0.042) (0.042) (0.042)
Children (6-12 years) 0.098** 0.107*** 0.109***
(0.039) (0.039) (0.038)
Children (13-17 years) 0.060 0.063 0.056
(0.044) (0.045) (0.044)
Employment
Civil servant 0.203 0.192
(0.266) (0.256)
Indep. occupation 0.117* 0.112
(0.069) (0.068)













Observations 1401 1380 1371 1371 1371
R2 0.169 0.177 0.182 0.200 0.205
Notes: The table reports coeﬃcients of multivariate regressions with standard errors clustered at VSLA level in
brackets. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 denote statistical significance.
The outcome variable is a factor score composed of the four financial literacy questions. Happiness and Depression
are scores on a scale designed to measure mental well-being.
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Table A.18: OLS results on FL Dummy
  / SE   / SE   / SE   / SE   / SE
Socio-demographics
Female  0.077***  0.075***  0.072***  0.084***  0.082***
(0.025) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026)
Age 0.015** 0.014** 0.009 0.011 0.011
(0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Age2  0.000***  0.000***  0.000  0.000*  0.000*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Spell 0.114*** 0.109*** 0.112*** 0.105*** 0.102***
(0.025) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026)
Married 0.034 0.025  0.009  0.001 0.001
(0.046) (0.047) (0.050) (0.050) (0.050)
Widowed  0.055  0.047  0.073  0.066  0.066
(0.063) (0.064) (0.068) (0.068) (0.068)
Divorced  0.008  0.006  0.036  0.020  0.020
(0.067) (0.067) (0.070) (0.069) (0.069)
Happiness 0.016 0.005 0.006 0.005 0.005
(0.018) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019)
Depression  0.056**  0.049*  0.051*  0.039  0.039
(0.026) (0.027) (0.027) (0.026) (0.026)
Income
Expenditure (Q2) 0.039 0.038 0.031 0.030
(0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035)
Expenditure (Q3) 0.085** 0.083** 0.066* 0.063*
(0.035) (0.036) (0.035) (0.035)
Expenditure (Q4) 0.051 0.054 0.017 0.014
(0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036)
Assets
Asset index 0.003 0.004  0.000  0.002
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009)
Household
HH size  0.013  0.015  0.015
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Children (0-5 years) 0.022 0.024 0.024
(0.017) (0.018) (0.018)
Children (6-12 years) 0.036** 0.040*** 0.040***
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
Children (13-17 years) 0.016 0.016 0.015
(0.018) (0.017) (0.017)
Employment
Civil servant 0.158* 0.158*
(0.093) (0.093)
Indep. occupation 0.068*** 0.068***
(0.025) (0.025)













Observations 1401 1380 1371 1360 1360
R2
Notes: The table reports coeﬃcients of multivariate regressions with standard errors clustered at VSLA level in
brackets. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 denote statistical significance.
The outcome variable is a dummy that is one if all financial literacy questions were answered correctly. Happiness
and Depression are scores on a scale designed to measure mental well-being.
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Table A.19: Linear and non-linear decomposition results
without Assets with Assets
Coeﬃcient Share Coeﬃcient Share
Financial literacy factor score OLS Estimates
Male 0.365⇤⇤⇤ 0.365⇤⇤⇤
Female  0.103⇤  0.103⇤
Diﬀerence 0.468⇤⇤⇤ 100.000 0.468⇤⇤⇤ 100.000
Endowment Eﬀ. 0.222⇤⇤⇤ 47.378 0.222⇤⇤⇤ 47.389
Coeﬃcient Eﬀ. 0.246⇤⇤ 52.622 0.246⇤⇤⇤ 52.611
Financial literacy dummy Probit Estimates
Male 0.340⇤⇤⇤ 0.340⇤⇤⇤
Female 0.217⇤⇤⇤ 0.217⇤⇤⇤
Diﬀerence 0.123⇤⇤⇤ 100.000 0.123⇤⇤⇤ 100.000
Endowment Eﬀ. 0.050⇤⇤⇤ 40.915 0.050⇤⇤⇤ 40.989
Coeﬃcient Eﬀ. 0.073⇤⇤ 59.085 0.073⇤⇤ 59.011
Notes: ⇤p < 0.10, ⇤⇤p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤p < 0.01 denote statistical significance.
Due to rounding shares may not add up.
Table A.20: Decomposition results adding group variables
without Assets with Assets
Coeﬃcient Share Coeﬃcient Share
Endowment Eﬀ.
Socio-demographics 0.031 6.409 0.028 5.905
Education 0.103⇤⇤⇤ 21.555 0.104⇤⇤⇤ 21.591
Personality 0.092⇤⇤⇤ 19.137 0.094⇤⇤⇤ 19.597
Group characteristics  0.001  0.272  0.001  0.272
Coeﬃcient Eﬀ.
Socio-demographics 0.710 147.815 0.603 125.702
Education 0.059 12.222 0.041 8.506
Personality  0.799⇤  166.328  0.921⇤  191.778
Group characteristics  1.900  395.760  1.770  368.612




Diﬀerence 0.480⇤⇤⇤ 100.000 0.480⇤⇤⇤ 100.000
Endowment Eﬀ. 0.225⇤⇤⇤ 46.829 0.225⇤⇤⇤ 46.820
Coeﬃcient Eﬀ. 0.255⇤⇤⇤ 53.171 0.255⇤⇤⇤ 53.180
Notes: ⇤p < 0.10, ⇤⇤p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤p < 0.01 denote statistical significance.
Due to rounding shares may not add up.
Group variables are: age of the group, number of members, yearly share out, and the default rate.
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Figure A.1: Geographical distribution of financial literacy group averages
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Figure A.2: Histogram group instrument
Figure A.3: Histogram distance instrument
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